Tax structure and revenue-raising capacity in Spain : a comparative analysis with the EU by Hernández de Cos, Pablo & López Rodríguez, David
TAX STRUCTURE AND 
REVENUE-RAISING CAPACITY 
IN SPAIN: A COMPARATIVE 
ANALYSIS WITH THE EU 
Documentos Ocasionales
N.º 1406
Pablo Hernández de Cos 
and David López Rodríguez
2014
TAX STRUCTURE AND REVENUE-RAISING CAPACITY IN SPAIN: 
A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS WITH THE EU
Documentos Ocasionales. N.º 1406
2014
(*)The opinions expressed in this document are the responsibility of the authors and, therefore, do not necessarily 
coincide with those of the Banco de España or the Eurosystem.
(**) A preliminary and partial version of this document was prepared in connection with the groundwork for the 
Committee of Experts for Reform of the Spanish Tax System, established in July 2013 and which reported in March 
2014. We are grateful to Antonio Montesinos for his technical support and comments. Contact details: Pablo Hernández 
de Cos, D.G. Economics, Statistics and Research, Banco de España. E-mail: pablo.hernandez_de_cos@bde.es.
Pablo Hernández de Cos(**) and David López Rodríguez
BANCO DE ESPAÑA
TAX STRUCTURE AND REVENUE-RAISING CAPACITY 
IN SPAIN: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS WITH THE EU (*)
The Occasional Paper Series seeks to disseminate work conducted at the Banco de España, in the 
performance of its functions, that may be of general interest.
The opinions and analyses in the Occasional Paper Series are the responsibility of the authors and, 
therefore, do not necessarily coincide with those of the Banco de España or the Eurosystem.
The Banco de España disseminates its main reports and most of its publications via the Internet at the 
following website: http://www.bde.es.
Reproduction for educational and non-commercial purposes is permitted provided that the source is 
acknowledged.
© BANCO DE ESPAÑA, Madrid, 2014.
ISSN: 1696-2230 (on line)
Abstract
This paper describes the revenue-raising capacity and structure of the Spanish tax system, in 
comparison with the economies of the European Union. Spain stands out for the low weight of 
its tax revenues in GDP relative to the EU27 average. This lower weight of tax revenue is mainly 
a consequence of indirect taxes (VAT, excise duties and environmental taxes). In fact, Spain 
has the lowest weight of consumption taxation in the European Union. As regards labour 
taxation, revenue raised as a proportion of GDP is similar to the EU27 average, although the 
weight of social security contributions in GDP, in particular those charged to employers, is 
higher. Spain also raises relatively more revenue from the taxation of capital, in particular from 
the taxation of wealth.
Keywords: tax burden, tax structure, taxation in the EU.
JEL classifi cation: H20, E62, H23, H24, H25.
Resumen
En este documento se presenta una descripción de la capacidad recaudatoria y la estructura 
tributaria del sistema fi scal español en comparación con las economías de la Unión Europea. 
España destaca por presentar un peso de los ingresos tributarios sobre PIB relativamente 
reducido en relación con la media de la UE27. Esta menor recaudación relativa se debe 
esencialmente a la imposición indirecta (IVA, impuestos especiales y medioambientales). De 
hecho, España tiene el menor peso en imposición sobre el consumo de todos los países de 
la UE27. En cuanto a la imposición sobre el trabajo, la recaudación en porcentaje del PIB en 
España es similar a la media de la UE27. Sin embargo, el peso de las cotizaciones sociales 
sobre PIB es superior, en particular las que recaen sobre las empresas. Por su parte, los 
ingresos derivados de la imposición sobre el capital son también más elevados en el caso 
español, en particular los relativos a la tributación sobre la riqueza. 
Palabras clave: presión fi scal, estructura impositiva, imposición en la UE.
Códigos JEL: H20, E62, H23, H24, H25.
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1 Introduction
The deterioration of public fi nances has been one of the most visible and persistent 
consequences of the recent economic crisis in most developed countries. As a result, in 
recent years fi scal policy has been shaped by the need to reduce the defi cit and public debt 
to sustainable levels. In this respect Spain has been no exception: the budget defi cit rose 
signifi cantly during the crisis, peaking at 11.1% of GDP in 2009, and then decreased to 6.6% 
of GDP in 2013 (7.1% including the impact of the aid to the fi nancial sector) as a result of the 
fi scal consolidation process. The adjustment should continue in coming years, with the aim of 
reaching a structural balance and breaking away from the trend of rising public debt followed by 
its subsequent reduction. 
The most recent economic literature stresses the importance of budgetary consolidation 
measures being appropriately shared between the different public expenditure and revenue 
headings, as there is evidence that this can make or break the success of the process and its 
impact on economic activity both in the short and the long term. In this setting, in June 2013 
the European Council recommended that the Spanish fi scal adjustment be accompanied by a 
systematic expenditure review and a review of the tax system,1 to identify the composition of the 
adjustment that would be most conducive to economic growth. In the tax fi eld, in July 2013 the 
Spanish government tasked a Committee of Experts to produce a report including a diagnosis 
of the problems of the tax system and a proposed set of reforms. The report was presented in 
March 2014 (see Committee of Experts, 2014). Subsequently, in August 2014, the government 
submitted to Parliament the bills for reform of various taxes, essentially personal income tax 
(IRPF) and corporate income tax, resulting in amendments which would come into force in 
January 2015.
Tax revenue played a crucial part in the deterioration of the budgetary situation in 
Spain during the crisis and in the fi scal consolidation process. Specifi cally, the decline in public 
revenue explains almost 50% of the increase in the budget defi cit between 2007 and 2009.2 
Subsequently, in the period 2009 to 2013, 60% of the decline in the budget defi cit (by 4.5 pp of 
GDP) was due to the increase in revenue (2.5 pp of GDP in the same period).
Aside of the key role played by public revenue as a proportion of GDP in the recent 
performance of Spain’s public fi nances, the tax burden and tax structure in Spain are both unique 
compared with the European Union (EU) economies with similar levels of economic development 
and public services. This paper precisely aims to document these unique characteristics, 
examining the recent performance of the revenue-raising capacity of the Spanish tax system 
and its main components, compared with the other EU countries. For this purpose, the second 
1  See Council of the European Union (2013): COUNCIL RECOMMENDATION with a view to bringing an end to the 
situation of an excessive government defi cit in Spain, 20 June 2013.
2 The defi cit rose by 13.1 pp of GDP in that period, while revenue fell by 6 pp of GDP.
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section analyses the level and comparative development of the revenue-raising capacity of the 
Spanish tax system. The relative position of Spain’s main taxes is then discussed in greater detail; 
specifi cally in fi ve sections, dedicated to the taxation of labour, consumption, the environment, 
capital and property, respectively. The last section sums up the main conclusions drawn. There 
is also a box which analyses tax collection trends in Spain during the economic crisis.
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2 The tax burden and tax structure: Spain and the EU
The tax burden is generally analysed and compared from one country to another on the 
basis of tax revenue as a proportion of GDP and the average effective rates of the main taxes, 
defi ned as the ratio of tax revenue to macroeconomic variables that proxy the tax base. These are 
also the measures used in this paper, based on the information released by Eurostat and the OECD, 
available up to 2012.3
It should be noted, however, that these measures entail some methodological issues 
concerning both levels and trends, making comparisons from one country to another diffi cult (OECD 
2000). In particular, they exclude key aspects affecting the actual tax burden, such as whether 
welfare benefi ts are subject to tax, the redistributive impact of public spending funded through tax, 
or the existence of a black economy that results in tax evasion. In consequence, the conclusions 
that may be drawn from these magnitudes must be viewed with caution.
2.1 Tax burden
The development of the welfare state in the countries of western Europe in the second half 
of the 20th century obliged those countries to increase their revenue-raising capacity. This stylised fact 
may be seen in the gradual and persistent increase in tax revenue as a proportion of GDP in the EU154 
countries between 1965 and the end of the century (see Chart 1). Subsequently this variable steadied, 
with just minor fl uctuations essentially linked to the economic cycle. As a result, the revenue-raising 
capacity of the EU155 in weighted average terms in 2012 was almost 40% of GDP, 13 pp higher than 
in 1965. This tax burden is higher than that recorded in the main OECD developed economies.6 
Although this variable has performed similarly in the EU countries overall, there is a high 
level of heterogeneity from one country to another. Specifi cally, the tax burden7 amounted to 36.3% 
of GDP in average terms in 2012 for the EU27 countries, and 39.4% of GDP in weighted average 
terms (see Chart 2). However, in Belgium, the Netherlands, France and Italy the ratio was over 44% 
of GDP, whereas at the opposite end of the scale, in Lithuania, Bulgaria, Latvia, Rumania, Slovakia 
and Ireland the fi gures were below 30% of GDP. Spain’s tax revenue as a proportion of GDP is quite 
low, at 32.5% (see Charts 2 and 3).
3  The main data sources used in this paper are Taxation Trends in the European Union (Eurostat 2014) and OECD Tax 
Statistics (OECD 2013). 
4  The EU15 benchmark is used here because it has the longest historical series available. The EU15 comprises Germany, 
France, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, the United Kingdom, Denmark, Ireland, Greece, Spain, Portugal, 
Austria, Finland and Sweden. 
5  In this paper the term “average” will be used to refer to the arithmetic average. Any reference to a weighted average will 
be made explicitly. The arithmetic average treats all economies equally, irrespective of their size, whereas the weighted 
average is more representative of the larger EU countries, especially Germany and France.
6  For example, the Japanese tax burden reached 29.5% of GDP in 1989, before steadying around 25%-30%, and in the 
United States the ratio has been steady around 25% for the past fi ve decades.
7  The tax burden is measured as the revenue obtained from taxes on production and imports (ESA 95 code D.2), current 
taxes on income and wealth (ESA 95 code D.5), capital taxes (D.91) and compulsory actual social contributions (D.61111 
+ D.61121 + D.61131), minus the adjustment  for uncertain collection. For details of this defi nition and others used in this 
paper, see Taxation trends in the European Union, edition 2014, Annex B: Methodology and explanatory notes.
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Analysing how the ratio has evolved over time, Spain has not been impervious to the 
European trend, although there are certain differences largely deriving from its low level of taxation 
at the onset. Thus, the gap between the level of taxation in Spain and the EU15 remained at 
around 14 pp of GDP up to 1977. A process of convergence then ensued, as a result, among 
other factors, of the 1978 tax reform, with the tax burden growing by 15 pp of GDP between 
1977 and 1989, narrowing the gap with the EU15 to approximately 5 pp of GDP in that year. 
Convergence in tax collection came to a standstill in the 1990s, but during the last expansionary 
phase of the Spanish economy (1997-2007), which was accompanied by a sharp increase in tax 
collection, the tax burden gap narrowed further, to 2 pp of GDP compared with the EU15 average 
and complete convergence with the EU27. Nevertheless, the recent economic crisis showed 
that the increase in tax collection in the expansionary phase was essentially owing to temporary 
factors, linked to the fi nancial and property boom. As a result, the crisis triggered an abrupt 
drop in tax collection (from 37.1% of GDP in 2007 to 30.7% in 2009) and a marked increase in 
the taxation differences relative to the EU average (see Box 1 for a more detailed explanation of 
tax collection trends in Spain during the crisis). Specifi cally, considering that the tax burden was 
virtually constant throughout the recession in the EU economies overall, Spain’s revenue-raising 
capacity was approximately 7 pp of GDP below the weighted average of the EU27 (3.7 pp of GDP 
relative to the EU27 average) in 2012, which relative levels are similar to those seen in the 1990s.
2.2 Tax structure
Analysis of the tax revenue structure (see Chart 4) shows that indirect taxes8 are the main 
taxes in the EU27, accounting for 38.9% of total revenue, followed by social contributions9 and 
direct taxes,10 which each have a similar weight (30.9% and 30.4%, respectively). However, the 
differences in the weight of the three groups of taxes are smaller if the weighted average of the 
EU27 is used.11 
As in the case of tax burden levels, there are signifi cant differences in the tax structure 
of the EU member states. For example, in Denmark, Ireland, Sweden, Malta and the United 
Kingdom social contributions account for less than 20% of total tax revenue, signifi cantly lower 
than in the Netherlands, Lithuania, the Czech Republic, Slovenia and Slovakia where they account 
for more than 40%. In turn, indirect taxes account for less than 30% of the total tax burden 
in Belgium and Germany, but for more than 50% in Bulgaria and Croatia. There is also a high 
degree of heterogeneity in the case of direct taxes, which account for more than 40% of the total 
in Denmark, Ireland, Malta, Sweden and the United Kingdom, but for less than 20% in the new 
Member States such as Lithuania, Bulgaria, Croatia and Slovakia that have adopted a fl at tax.
8   Indirect taxes are equivalent to taxes on production and imports (D2), which include value added tax (D.211; VAT and 
IGIC, the Canary Islands general indirect tax, in the case of Spain), taxes and duties on imports excluding VAT (D.212), 
taxes on products except VAT and import taxes (D.214) and other taxes on production (D.29). 
9   Social contributions are defi ned as compulsory actual social contributions and include those paid by employers 
(D.61111) and employees (D.61121) and those paid by self- and non-employed persons (D.61131). 
10  Direct taxes are defi ned as current taxes on income and wealth (D.5) plus capital taxes (D.91).
11  The European tax structure is quite different from the tax structures of the United States or Japan. In the US, direct 
taxes on individuals and corporations account for a very large portion (47% of all tax raised) and indirect taxes for a 
very small portion. In Japan more than 40% of revenue is collected through social contributions.
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The particular characteristics of the Spanish tax structure lie in the higher weight of 
social contributions as a proportion of total tax revenue (36.8% of the total, 6 pp above the 
EU27 average in 2012). This is offset by the lower weight of indirect taxes (32.9% of the total, 6 
pp below the average), while direct taxes (30.4% of the total) are 2.3 pp higher than the EU27 
average (but below the weighted average).
In terms of GDP (see Chart 5) the lower level of taxation in Spain is due, essentially, to 
indirect taxes which are some 3 pp below the (arithmetic and weighted) average of the EU27, 
owing in particular to a lower weight of VAT (2.4 pp of GDP lower) and of excise duties and other 
taxes on consumption (1 pp of GDP lower). In turn, the weight of direct taxes in GDP in Spain 
is also lower: 0.7 pp of GDP below the EU27 average and 2.5 pp below the weighted average. 
Conversely, the weight of social contributions in Spain is 0.9 pp of GDP higher than the EU27 
average, although it is 0.8 pp of GDP lower than the weighted average.
Turning to how the tax structure has evolved, the above-mentioned increase in the 
tax burden in the EU15 (see Chart 4), which amounted to 13 pp of GDP between 1965 and 
2000, was essentially explained by social contributions, which rose by almost 5 pp of GDP. The 
remainder was shared between direct taxes on individuals (3.4 pp of GDP), indirect taxes (1.6 
pp of GDP) and direct taxes on corporations (1.8 pp of GDP). Since 2000 the tax structure has 
remained relatively stable in the EU15.
The Spanish tax structure has evolved similarly to that of the EU, although with a 
stronger growth profi le. The tax burden rose by almost 20 pp of GDP in the period 1965 to 
2000. Contributing to this increase, social contributions rose by more than 8 pp of GDP, growing 
particularly in the 1980s. The remainder is split between direct taxes on individuals (4.3 pp of 
GDP), indirect taxes (4.2 pp of GDP), direct taxes on fi rms (1.7 pp of GDP) and property taxes 
(1.2 pp of GDP). In turn, in the last expansionary phase the growth in the tax burden in Spain 
was the result of higher tax revenue obtained from direct taxes on fi rms and indirect taxes. The 
fall in tax revenue during the crisis was also concentrated on these two groups.
If the tax structure is organised by taxes on labour (including social contributions),12 
capital13 and consumption14 (see Chart 6), the fi rst group proves to be the main source of revenue 
in the EU27, accounting for 47% of total revenue in average terms, compared with 35% obtained 
from taxes on consumption and 18% from taxes on capital. There are also signifi cant differences 
between Spain and the EU27 in terms of the weight in GDP of the three groups. In the case of 
taxes on consumption, Spain has the lowest relative weight of all the EU27 countries in 2012 
(8.6% of GDP compared with the EU average of 12.3%). Spanish taxes on labour have a similar 
weight in GDP to the EU27 average (around 17% of GDP), although the breakdown is different. 
Specifi cally, taxes on labour paid by employers are 1.5 pp of GDP higher, while taxes on labour 
12  Taxes on labour include compulsory actual social contributions (D.61111+ D.61121) and total wage bill and payroll 
taxes (D.29c) and the part of personal income tax (D.51a) related to earned income (but which also includes other 
sources of income such as pensions, unemployment, etc.), specifi cally taxes on individual or household income 
excluding holding gains (D.51a). It is important to note that personal income tax and contributions of self-employed 
persons are included not as taxes on labour but as taxes on capital.
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paid by employees are 1.8 pp lower. Lastly, Spanish taxes on capital are above the EU27 average 
(7.5% and 6.7% of GDP, respectively).
In terms of implicit tax rates, which are computed as the ratio of tax revenue to 
macroeconomic variables that provide the closest proxy to the tax base,15 the comparative 
analysis shows that the greatest differences are to be found in taxes on consumption, which in 
Spain are 7.6 pp lower than the EU27 average in 2012 (14% compared with 21.6%) (see Chart 
7). Implicit tax rates on labour are similar (33.5% in Spain and 34.2% in the EU), while in the case 
of taxes on capital they are slightly higher (25.3% in Spain compared with 23.5% in the EU).
In addition, Spain obtains less tax revenue from environmental taxes,16 approximately 
1 pp of GDP less than the EU27 average, owing to revenue from taxes on energy and on 
transport (excluding taxes on oil and gas). Conversely, Spain obtains more revenue from property 
taxes17 (0.8 pp of GDP more than the EU27 average) owing to the higher taxation on property 
transactions and, following the recent increases in property tax, on property holdings also.
Lastly, in respect of the distribution of tax powers among different levels of government, 
Spain is one of the most highly decentralised countries in Europe, as more than 40% of taxes 
are ceded to or received by regional and local governments, which is the highest level of all the 
EU countries and well above the average, at 10% (see Chart 8).
13  There are two groups of capital taxes. First, taxes on capital and business income, which include the part of personal 
income tax paid on dividends, interest and holding gains, along with self-employed income (part of D.51a + D.51c1), 
social contributions paid by self-employed persons (part of D.61131), corporate income tax (D.51b + D.51c2 + D.51c3) 
and taxes on winnings from lottery and gambling (D.51d). Second, wealth taxes, including some current taxes on capital 
(D.59a: wealth tax and property tax on empty housing), capital taxes (D.91, which include inheritance and gift tax, 
excise duties, urban development charges and tax on the increase in urban land value), taxes on land, buildings or other 
structures (D.29a, which in Spain includes property tax, the special levy on the property of non-resident entities, the tax 
on large retail outlets and other taxes on land, buildings and other structures), taxes on the use of fi xed assets (D.29b, in 
the case of Spain the tax on motor vehicles for fi rms), the taxes paid by fi rms to obtain business and professional licences 
(D.29e, in particular in the case of Spain the tax on economic activities, charges for obtaining business and professional 
licences, charges for private or special use of public property and zoning permits (planning permission), and the motor 
ordinance test (MOT) charge, among others), other taxes on production (D.29h, which include the tax on deposits at credit 
institutions, among others) and certain taxes on products (part of D.214 relating to transfer tax and stamp tax).
14  Taxes on consumption include value added type taxes (ESA 95 code D.211; in the case of Spain VAT and IGIC, the 
Canary Islands general indirect tax), taxes and duties on imports excluding VAT (D.212), taxes on products, except VAT 
and import taxes (D.214: in the case of Spain these include a large number of taxes such as those on hydrocarbons, 
electricity, alcohol and tobacco; they do not include transfer tax and stamp tax, taxes on fi nancial and capital transactions 
and export duties), taxes on pollution (D.29f) and payments by households for licences (D.59d), among others.
15  See Taxation trends in the European Union, edition 2014, Annex B: Methodology and explanatory notes.
16  There are three groups of environmental taxes. First, energy taxes, which in the case of Spain include the tax on oil 
and gas, the tax on electricity, the tax on oil-derived fuels, the tax on retail sales of certain oil and gas products, the 
charges established by the National Energy Commission and the surcharge applied (since 2008) under the Energy Saving 
and Effi ciency Plan, petrol tax and the tax on energy generation and transmission that affect the environment. Second, 
transport taxes, which in the case of Spain include the excise duty on certain means of transport, the tax on motor 
vehicles and the motor ordinance test (MOT) charge. And third, taxes on pollution, which in Spain include waste water 
taxes and charges, oil and gas and mining royalties, taxes and charges on gas emissions and air pollution, the tax on 
hunting and fi shing, the tax on stays in holiday accommodation (up to 2002, on installations that affected the environment) 
and hunting and fi shing licences.
17  There are two groups of property taxes. First, recurrent taxes on property which cover some current taxes on capital 
(D59a; in the case of Spain, the part of wealth tax relating to property and property tax on empty housing) and taxes 
on land, buildings or other structures (D.29a, which in Spain includes property tax, the special levy on property of non-
resident entities, the tax on large retail outlets and other taxes on land, buildings and other structures). And second, other 
taxes on property, which include all other current taxes on capital (D59a; all other parts of wealth tax), taxes on capital 
transfers (D.91a; in the case of Spain, inheritance and gift tax), transactions tax and stamp tax (D.214b,c) and capital 
levies (D.91b; excise duties, urban development charges, the tax on the increase in urban land value and urban land use).
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3 Taxes on labour
Taxes on labour are the main source of revenue in the EU, amounting to 17.2% of GDP 
in the EU27 in average terms in 2012 (20% of GDP in weighted average terms) and to more than 
47% of total revenue. In the case of Spain, taxes on labour amount to a similar weight in terms 
of GDP (17.2%), and to 53% of total revenue.
Implicit tax rates on labour stood at 34.2% in the EU27 in average terms in 2012, 
trending down slightly from 35.6% in 2000. However, this pattern conceals signifi cant differences 
from one country to another, with marked decreases in that period in countries such as Bulgaria, 
Lithuania, Sweden and Denmark and sharp increases in Cyprus, Greece and the Netherlands. 
There is also considerable divergence in the level of implicit tax rates in the EU, which are over 
40% in Italy, Austria, Finland or Belgium and close to 25% in the United Kingdom, Bulgaria and 
Portugal. Spain is between the two extremes, close to the EU27 average with an implicit tax 
rate of 33.5% in 2012.
The combined effect of social contributions and personal income tax is best measured 
in terms of the average tax wedge, which is the ratio between personal income tax on 
employment income and social contributions, on the one hand, and the average full-time gross 
wage in the private sector on the other. In Spain, the tax wedge thus measured is higher 
than the OECD average for all income brackets and types of taxpayers (for example, see 
Chart 9 for the most representative cases of a single taxpayer with no children and a married 
taxpayer with two children), but it is lower than the EU27 average.18 For instance, in the case 
of a single person with no children earning the average wage in the economy, the labour tax 
wedge in Spain in 2012 was 41%, compared with 35% in the OECD. The impact of tax benefi ts 
for certain family situations means that the tax wedge is lower in Spain (37%) for a married 
taxpayer with two children, although it continues to be higher than the OECD average (28%). 
Moreover, the labour tax wedge increased in Spain in the period 2000-2012, whereas in the 
OECD it declined signifi cantly.
3.1 Social contributions
Social contributions constitute the lion’s share of taxes on labour in the EU27, amounting 
to 11.1% of GDP and accounting for 31% of total tax revenue in 2012. However, despite their 
prominence overall, the fi gures differ considerably from one EU country to another. In particular, 
revenue from social contributions as a percentage of GDP are high (over 15%) in France, the 
Netherlands, the Czech Republic, Germany and Slovenia, and very low in Denmark (1%), Ireland 
(4%), Malta (6%) and the United Kingdom (6.7%). In Spain revenue from social contributions is 
18  The data source used for this analysis is the OECD database Taxing Wages, as there are no comparable data for the 
EU27 countries. In some cases, European Commission publications (see, for example, Tax reforms in EU Member States, 
an annual serial publication) include those data for the EU countries; when this is the case, those results are mentioned 
in the text.
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above the EU27 average, with a relative weight of 12% of GDP in 2012, accounting for 37% of 
total revenue (see Chart 10). Social contributions in Spain have remained constant at around 
12% of GDP since 1995, while in the EU27 they have declined somewhat (by 0.5% of GDP in 
average terms and by 1.3% of GDP in weighted average terms).
The breakdown between social contributions paid by employers and by employees 
shows that Spain has a relatively higher weight of contributions paid by employers (70% 
compared with 58% in the EU27) and of contributions received from the self-employed (15% 
compared with the EU27 average of 10%).
The high revenue-raising capacity of social contributions is a consequence of the tax 
rates applied to the contribution bases, which are generally determined by wages. In the OECD, 
legal rates of employees’ social contributions stood at 27.6% on average in 2012, compared 
with 36.25% in Spain.
At the same time it is important to note that the effective rate of social contributions has 
been affected by the introduction of contribution ceilings and fl oors that have a redistributive impact 
on taxes on labour. In the OECD, 10 countries have established fl oors and 18 have established 
ceilings on contribution bases to which the legal rates are applied. In Spain there are both ceilings 
and fl oors on contribution bases for the different contingencies and professional categories. In 
2012 the contribution ceiling was 1.55 times higher than the average wage in the economy, well 
below the average established in the OECD countries that have contribution ceilings.
3.2 Personal income tax
Personal income tax in the EU27 amounted to 9.1% of GDP in weighted average 
terms and to 7.7% of GDP in arithmetic average terms in 2012, compared with 7.8% in Spain. 
Personal income tax is usually characterised by its progressiveness, with marginal tax rates that 
are higher than average rates in the different income brackets. In this respect, a trend towards 
simplifi cation of personal income tax is observed, refl ected in the generalised cut in the number 
of tax brackets, which in the case of the OECD went from 14 in 1981 to six in 1990, remaining 
steady thereafter at around fi ve (see Chart 11). In Spain this simplifi cation process was more 
pronounced, as the number of tax brackets went from more than 30 in the 1980s to just four in 
2010, although it was raised again to seven in 2012.
Cuts in the number of tax brackets have been associated with a general trend towards 
cuts in top legal rates of tax (see Chart 12). The latter were very signifi cant in the 1980s, when 
top rates of tax in the OECD countries fell on average by 15 pp, from 65.7% in 1981 to 50.6% 
in 1990. The cuts continued, although at a slower pace, in the 1990s, with a drop of 4 pp to 
46.5% in 2000, and in the following decade, with a drop of 5 pp to 41.7% in 2010. This trend 
was also observed in Europe: before the recent economic crisis, top rates of tax stood at 37% in 
the EU27 on average and at 40.8% in the EU17. However, as a result of the fi scal consolidation 
processes needed to correct the fi scal imbalances that accompanied the economic crisis, top 
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rates of tax rose on average by 1.7 pp in the EU27 and by 3.7 pp in the EU17 in the period 
2009-2013. In this setting, Spain, with a top rate of tax of 52% since 2012, is currently one of 
the countries with the highest top rates of personal income tax.
However, the impact of the top rate of tax on labour income must take into account the 
wage level at which it comes into play, measured, for example, as a proportion of the average 
wage in the economy. In the OECD average, in 2010 the top rate of tax came into play at a 
level of labour income that tripled the average wage in the economy, in a descending pattern 
compared, for example, with the year 2000, when it came into play at income levels that were 
fi ve or more times higher than the average wage in the economy (see Chart 13). In general, 
therefore, as top rates of tax were lowered in that period the income levels at which they came 
into play decreased.19 That income level also fell sharply in Spain, from 4.2 times to 2.2 times 
in 2010. Conversely, the recent hike in top rates of tax was accompanied by an increase in the 
level at which they come into play.
The minimum rate of tax was 15.5% on average in the OECD in 2010, with notable 
differences from one country to another as to the level of the minimum rate of tax and its development 
over the previous decade (see Chart 14). Specifi cally in that period, 17 countries cut their minimum 
rates, 13 raised them and only four left them unchanged, with the highest minimum rate of tax 
standing at 36.5% in Austria and the lowest at 2.3% in the Netherlands. In this setting, Spain raised 
its minimum rate signifi cantly, up to 24%, which is one of the highest levels in the OECD. At the same 
time, tax exemptions for low-income earners were raised and/or personal (tax-free) allowances were 
introduced. Specifi cally, that exemption, measured as a percentage of the average wage in the 
economy, was 23% in the OECD in 2010, compared with 21% of the average wage (19% in 2000) 
in Spain. The effect of these exemptions may also be measured according to the average wage level 
at which taxpayers start to pay personal income tax. In the OECD countries on average this level is 
around one-third of the average wage, having risen by 10% between 2000 and 2010 (see Chart 15); 
in Spain it is around 40% of the average wage, which is one of the highest levels observed.
It may generally be asserted that personal income tax rates, brackets and exemptions 
have led to a reduction in the marginal rates applicable to a representative worker in the OECD 
countries (see Chart 16). For example, an employee earning the average wage in the economy, 
with no possibility of applying deductions for family reasons, saw his/her marginal rate decline 
from 30.5% to 27.4% from 2000 to 2010. In Spain, however, there was an increase from 24% to 
28% over this same period. As to the average effective rates applicable to the average wage in 
the economy, these fell from 16% in 2000 to 14.5% in 2012 in the OECD on average (see Chart 
17). In Spain, however, average effective rates held stable at levels close to the OECD average. 
As indicated in the introduction, the proposed tax reform submitted in August 2014 
that is in passage through Parliament includes a signifi cant amendment to this tax which, if 
19  In the period 2000-2010, in 19 of the 26 countries where top rates of tax were cut, the income level at which they came 
into play decreased.
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approved, will substantially alter the results of the international comparison detailed above, 
bringing Spain closer to the European average in several respects. Specifi cally, the proposal 
includes a reduction in the number of brackets in the standard personal income tax schedule 
from seven to fi ve, with a minimum rate that would fall from 24.75% to 19% in 2016 (20% in 
2015) and a maximum rate that would decline from 52% at present to 45% in 2016 (47% in 
2015) and which would be applicable as from yearly income of €60,000.20 
20  Other proposed amendments include extending the base of the personal and family allowance by increasing the 
general personal allowance and minimum family allowance on the basis of the number of children, dependent 
ascendant relatives and disabled persons. Further, deductions for income from employment or economic activities are 
eliminated and, in their place, a new tax-exempt deductible expense is introduced which reduces taxable income by 
€2,000 for those earning employment income. At the same time, a deduction of €3,700 is set for net income less than 
€11,250, with this deduction progressively diminishing from €3,700 to €0 for income between €11,250 and €14,450.
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4 Taxes on consumption
The taxation of consumption in the EU rests essentially on value added tax (VAT) 
and on a set of taxes levied on specifi c consumption commonly grouped under the name of 
excise duties. The revenue raised in 2012 by these taxes accounted for 12.3% of GDP in the 
EU27. Among all the EU economies, Spain evidences the lowest revenue-raising capacity in 
terms of taxes on consumption, posting a fi gure of 8.6% of GDP in 2012. 
Analysis of the implied rates on consumption reveals (see Chart 7) that these have held 
relatively stable over the past 15 years, at around 21% in the EU27. Against this background, 
Spain stands out in that it has the lowest implied rate in the EU27 (14%), and that this rate 
has oscillated strongly over the recent business cycle. During the forceful upturn prior to the 
economic crisis, the implied rate in Spain stood at 16.6% in 2006, falling sharply to 12.5% in 
2009. The successive tax rises applied in Spain throughout the fi scal consolidation process 
gave rise to a partial recovery in the implied rate on consumption in the 2010-2012 period, 
which stood at 14% in this latter year, though still some distance off the EU27 average. 
4.1 Value Added Tax
VAT is the main tax levied on consumption in Europe, accounting for 7.9% of GDP 
on average in the EU27 in 2012. Despite being a harmonised EU tax, the extensive regulatory 
leeway the Member States enjoy has given rise to notable heterogeneity both in the marginal 
rates applied and in the breadth of the base subject to VAT. As regards standard VAT rates, 
prior to the crisis they ranged from 25% in Denmark and Sweden to 15% in Luxembourg. In 
relation to the base, some Member States apply reduced super-reduced rates – substantially 
below the standard rate – to a wide range of goods in the consumer basket. This divergence 
in rates and in the width of the VAT bases has given rise to notable differences in the VAT 
revenue-raising capacity of the EU countries, with levels of over 9% of GDP in Croatia, 
Denmark, Sweden, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland compared with 5.5% in Spain in 2012 (see 
Chart 18). 
The fi scal consolidation processes initiated in 2009 resorted in a generalised fashion 
to rate rises and to the widening of VAT bases in order to reduce the high budget defi cits 
generated, a phenomenon especially visible in the countries most affected by the crisis. The 
reforms prioritised rises in the standard rate. As a result of these rises, the standard VAT 
rate in the EU27, which had held stable around 19.5% since 2002, has increased by 1.8 pp 
since 2009 to 21.3% at present (see Charts 19 and 20). Against this background, Spain has 
been one of the countries with the biggest VAT rises, both in the standard rate (from 16% in 
2009 to 21% at present) and in the reduced rate (from 7% to 10%). At the same time, Spain 
has widened the VAT base. Despite these measures, and as earlier indicated, Spain’s VAT 
revenue-raising capacity stands at the lowest levels in the EU (5.5% of GDP in 2012 and 6% 
of GDP in 2013).
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In order to examine the impact of goods exempt from or subject to reduced rates in the 
revenue-raising capacity of this tax, the VAT Revenue Ratio (VRR) indicator is habitually used. This 
metric compares actual VAT revenue with those that would theoretically be obtained were the 
standard rate to be applied to private consumption in its entirety, taking National Accounts data. 
In this respect, the indicator measures the revenue loss associated with the existence of reduced 
rates but also with the presence of tax fraud, and it likewise depends on the consumption structure 
of the countries.21 The results provided by the European Commission (2012 and 2013) show that 
in the period 2000-2011, the combined effect of exemptions, reduced rates and tax evasion led 
to VAT raising (expressed in average EU27 terms) 50% of the theoretical revenue that would be 
obtained in the absence of tax evasion and reductions in the tax base (see Chart 21). In this 
analysis, Spain stands out along with Greece, Italy and Portugal in that it evidences the lowest VRR 
levels in the EU27, raising 45% of its potential revenue over the period on average. 
In a quantifi cation using uniform criteria for all the EU27 countries, based on data on 
fi nal household spending and on effective average rates obtained from the Harmonised Index 
of Consumer Prices (HICP), Borselli et al (2012) estimate that the existence of exemptions and 
reduced rates lowered the effective VAT rate by 25.6% on average in the EU27 in 2011. In Spain, 
this reduction in the effective rate was magnifi ed to 33%, owing to the application of reduced 
rates that affected more than 40% of consumer spending in 2011, and with 12% of additional 
spending that was exempt or to which VAT was not applied. The combination of these two effects 
means that more than 50% of household spending in Spain was not subject to the standard VAT 
rate, a percentage only exceeded by Greece, Ireland and Portugal. In Spain’s case, the defi nition 
of the base entails a difference in the effective as opposed to the standard VAT rate of 5.9 pp, 
which breaks down into 2.2 pp due to food processing; 1.4 pp to hotels, restaurants and package 
holidays; 1 pp to healthcare, education and culture; 0.7 pp to housing; 0.2 pp to transport and 0.3 
pp to other exemptions or reduced rates. 
An alternative approach to quantify the impact on VAT revenue in Spain of the existing 
reduced rates and exemptions is obtained from the information provided in the Notes to Tax Benefi ts 
accompanying the State Budget (see Table 1). Tax benefi ts are estimated according to this source 
as the difference between projected revenue and that which would be obtained were all transactions 
subject to VAT taxed at the standard rate (21%) instead of at an estimated effective weighted rate (13% 
in 2014). Under this methodology, the estimated revenue loss in Spain due to the limited scope of the 
VAT tax base stood at around 3% of GDP in 2014, representing 50% of effective revenue in 2013. 
4.2 Excise duties
Included under the heading of excise duties are a heterogeneous set of taxes levied on 
the consumption of specifi c goods such as alcohol, tobacco, hydrocarbons, coal, electricity and 
21  It should further be borne in mind that the measure of private consumption used approximates to but does not 
exactly match the consumption subject to VAT. For example, included under private consumption are the services 
generated by house ownership or fi nancial expenses, but excluded is the purchase of a new house considered as 
under investment. These factors may contribute to explaining the low levels observed in the VRR and part of the 
differences among countries with a consumer spending structure that is also different.
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certain modes of transport. In aggregate terms, these taxes account for around one-third of tax on 
consumption in the EU, albeit with differences in revenue-raising capacity relative to GDP across 
the Member States (see Chart 18). These differences are due to the maintenance of extensive 
regulatory power by the Member States, despite the harmonisation process pursued in successive 
EU directives defi ning the structure, instalments and minimum rates of these taxes. This regulatory 
capacity is discernible in the heterogeneity of implied rates across the EU countries, which range 
from 26% in Sweden to 40% in the Netherlands, Greece and Italy (Eurostat 2013).
The contribution in terms of revenue of excise duties in the Spanish tax system has 
been systematically below that observed in the EU countries: 2.2% of GDP in 2012 against 3.2% 
of GDP on average in the EU27. This lesser tax burden affects excise duties as a whole, but it is 
particularly signifi cant in the case of tobacco and alcohol, with revenue-raising capacity of 0.9% 
of GDP in 2012 compared with 1.2% on average in the EU27. Regarding tobacco taxes, the 
data provided by the European Commission (2013) show, however, that the weight accounted 
for by taxes relative to the weighted average price of tobacco in Spain is now aligned with 
the EU27 average, following the successive increases made in recent years. Overall, taxation 
accounts for 70% of the average price, with the lesser revenue-raising capacity due to the lower 
relative price of tobacco in Spain (in relation to the EU27 average) and to the structure of this 
taxation. Specifi cally, Spain is notable in that it has a specifi c component in respect of tobacco 
consumption with a very low weight (around 15%) compared with the ad valorem component. 
Also of note is the scant relative revenue raised from taxes on alcohol (0.1% of GDP), owing 
to the lower rates on the consumption of the various alcoholic beverages taxed, ranging from 
spirits to intermediate products, namely beer and wine, with the latter permanently among the 
lowest in the EU27.
Among excise duties, the biggest contribution to revenue-raising capacity is made by 
taxes on hydrocarbons, which in Spain accounted in 2012 for 1% of GDP, including revenue 
from the tax on retail sales of specifi c hydrocarbons (recently repealed). This revenue-raising 
level is, however, lower than the EU27 average, standing at 1.6% of GDP in 2012. A more 
detailed analysis follows of environmental taxes. 
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5 Environmental taxes
In the 1990s, the Nordic countries and Germany launched a tax reform, introducing 
new taxes pursuing environmental goals. Throughout this period, new taxes on energy and 
pollutant activities were created, and previously existing taxes such as those on hydrocarbons 
were adjusted to this end, setting defi nitions for bases and differential tax rates according to the 
attendant impact on the environment. “Green” taxes spread across the various EU members, 
with Spain proving a laggard in their application. 
In quantitative terms the revenue-raising capacity of these taxes in Spain is still limited, 
standing at 1.6% of GDP in 2012 compared with the EU27 average of 2.6% (see Charts 22 and 
23). The lesser weight of these taxes in Spain is largely due to the lesser tax burden in relation 
to energy (1.3% of GDP in Spain against 1.9% in the EU27), attributable above all to the lower 
taxes on hydrocarbons and transport. Indeed, in 2012 Spain was the EU country that raised 
least revenue from taxes on energy. In any event, fi scal consolidation requirements fomented the 
creation of new taxes in the 2012-13 period, such as the tax on electrical energy production, 
and an increase in the rates on excise duties for energy products and those used in electricity 
generation. These new taxes increased the tax burden by 0.2% of GDP, taking it to 1.8% in 2013. 
Analysis of the implied rates on these taxes indicates that lower revenue in Spain is 
partly due to lower tax rates. Specifi cally, the data for 2012 show an implied rate on energy (in 
real terms) that is 20% lower than the average rate for the EU27 (see Chart 23).
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6 Taxes on capital
Included under the category of taxes on capital are those levied on wealth22 and those 
on corporate income and on capital. The latter include corporate income tax and personal 
income tax which is levied on the income of the self-employed and the capital returns and gains 
of households. Overall, these taxes provide for revenue-raising capacity of 6.7% of GDP in the 
EU27 and of 7.5% in Spain in 2012; however, they are more relevant in the bigger economies, 
meaning that, in the case of the EU weighted average, the revenue-raising capacity of these 
taxes amounts to 8.2% of GDP. 
In terms of implied rates, these stand at 24.4% in the EU2723 in 2012, rising to 28.9% in 
the case of the EU weighted average. Generally, the trend of these rates in the EU over the past 
decade has been stable, or on a mildly declining path, despite notable cross-country heterogeneity 
and the successive reforms of taxes on capital. The divergence of implied rates in 2012 ranges 
from 44.9% in France and 35.7% in the United Kingdom to 8.1% in Estonia and 9.8% in Lithuania 
and Latvia. In Spain’s case, the implied rate is at 25.3%, slightly higher than the EU27 average.
The implied rate on capital may be broken down in to that levied on the income of 
companies and on capital, and that relating to wealth.24 The former stood at around 17% in 2012 
on average in the EU27 and slightly lower in Spain (15.7%), although once again with signifi cant 
differences from one country to another, from 6% in Estonia to 25.4% in Italy. As to the implied 
rate of taxes on wealth, this was 16.7% in 2012 on average in the EU2725 and 17.8% in Spain. 
Cross-country differences are once again most signifi cant, from 6% in Ireland to 28.6% in Cyprus. 
6.1 Taxes on corporations 
The tax on corporations is one of the main capital levies of the developed countries. 
Cross-country comparisons are, in any event, diffi cult, not only because of the very complexity 
of the tax but also because its revenue-raising capacity is strongly affected by the impact of the 
economic cycle and business profi ts. This procyclicality accounts for the strong increase in the 
attendant revenue in the EU27 to 2007, when it stood at 3.6% of GDP, and the heavy fall during 
the economic crisis, to 2.6% of GDP in 2010, which held unchanged in 2012 (see Chart 24). In 
Spain, the procyclicality of the tax on corporations has been even greater, with a sharp fall from 
4.8% of GDP in 2007 to 1.9% of GDP in 2010, and a subsequent recovery brought on by the 
tax increases approved as part of the fi scal consolidation process, to 2.2% in 2012. 
In any event, the revenue-raising capacity of the tax on corporations in the EU may be 
said to have been maintained despite the declining trend of the legal rate applied to corporate 
22  The signifi cance and composition of taxes on asset ownership will be discussed in greater detail in section 7.
23  These calculations only include the data of 21 countries, given that the fi gures for Bulgaria, Greece, Luxembourg, Malta 
and Romania are not available. In the case of Denmark the 2011 fi gure was taken, as this was the last available year.
24  See the details in footnote 13 of this paper.
25  Nor are data available here for Germany.
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income (see Chart 25). This reduction, from an average rate of 35.3% in 1995 to 23.5% in 2011, 
is partly due to the lower rates applied in the new EU member countries. The dispersion of 
legal rates in the tax on corporations in the EU ranges from a minimum of 10% in Cyprus and 
Bulgaria to a maximum of 36.1% in France (see Chart 26). Spain, despite successive reforms 
that have lowered legal rates, maintains a 30% rate for large corporations, which is relatively 
high in the context of the EU (the sixth highest legal rate in the EU27). However, Spain retains 
special arrangements for SMEs. Specifi cally, companies that do not exceed a certain turnover 
threshold, set at €10 million since 2011, are taxed at a legal rate of 25% on an amount of profi t 
subject to taxation (specifi cally on the fi rst €300,000), and enjoy advantages in the carrying of 
tax expenses such as accelerated depreciation. 
The introduction of deductions and rebates associated with the carrying out of specifi c 
business activities reduces the effective rate borne by corporations below the legal rate. The 
estimate of this effect in the EU27 by Sanz et al. (2011) shows that in 2009 the effective marginal 
rate in the EU27 was 7.85%, and the effective average rate 11%. Spain is notable in that it has one 
of the highest effective rates in the EU, with an estimated marginal rate of 19.5% and an average 
rate of 22%, as a result not only of its high legal rates but also of the fi scal adjustments that 
penalise the carrying as tax expenses of accounting expenses arising from specifi c amortisation 
criteria, and the scant quantitative impact of the related deductions and rebates. 
With a similar methodology, ZEW (2012) analyses the combined impact of the tax 
structure and the marginal rates of the tax on corporations on business investment decisions, 
based on the calculation of the effective average rate on investment. This measure, obtained in 
accordance with the methodology proposed by Devereux and Griffi th (2003), enables the impact 
of economic factors unrelated to tax policy on business decisions to be isolated. In the EU27 
as a whole, the effective average rates on investment was 20.9% in 2012, but with signifi cant 
cross-country differences (see Chart 27). The lowest average effective rates are in the 12 new EU 
Member States, such as Bulgaria (9%), Cyprus (11.2%) and Latvia (12.2%), and the highest rates 
are in France (34.2%) and Spain (32.4%). At the same time, these effective rates have been seen 
to move on a signifi cant declining trend in the past decade, moving from 29.3% in 1998 to 20.9% 
in 2012. Spain followed the same path, declining from 36.5% to 32.4% over the same period. 
However, the deductions and rebates that affect large corporations are those that have the 
greatest impact on the reduction of the corporate tax burden. Figures from the tax authorities show, 
in fact, that despite having a higher legal rate, large corporations have a signifi cantly lower effective 
rate, by between 5-8 pp, than SMEs and large corporations in the 2007-2011 period (see Chart 28). 
The impact of low rates and tax benefi ts on revenue raised from the tax on corporations 
in Spain may be quantifi ed drawing on the information provided by the Memoria de Benefi cios 
Fiscales (Notes to Tax Benefi ts; see Table 1). The sum is calculated as the difference between 
projected revenue this year and that which would be obtained were the existing measures not to 
be applied to reported tax bases. In the case of the reduced rate, estimated forgone revenue is 
€1,250 million. The impact of tax credits is estimated at €1,618 million, with €547 million most 
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notably relating to SMEs’ reinvestment of earnings and €243,000,000 to R+D activities. Overall, 
tax benefi ts in the tax on corporations are estimated at 0.3% of GDP in 2014, accounting for 
15% of envisaged revenue.26 
Furthermore, a general matter relating to the developed countries’ tax systems is that 
the structure of deductions and rebates under the tax on corporations generates incentives for 
corporate indebtedness (see Chart 28). This bias is due to the preferential treatment granted 
to external fi nancing, via the deductibility of fi nancial expenses, to the detriment of corporate 
fi nancing via equity or the reinvestment of earnings. In Spain’s case, this differential treatment 
translates into a difference in the average effective rate of 10 pp between self-fi nancing (35%) 
and debt fi nancing (25%), which is not very different from that observed in other EU countries 
(ZEW 2012). In recent years, however, certain limitations on the deductibility of corporations’ 
fi nancial expenses have been introduced. 
The proposed tax reform submitted to Parliament in August 2014 also includes 
substantial changes in this tax which, as in the case of personal income tax, will signifi cantly alter 
the international comparison described in the foregoing paragraphs. Among other aspects, the 
reform proposes a reduction in the tax rate for large corporations from 30% to 25% in 2016 (28% 
in 2015), closer, therefore, to the average rate of the EU27 countries. The 25% rate will also be 
applicable to SMEs, but for these companies a levelling reserve has been set up, meaning they 
may avail themselves of a 10% reduction in taxable income with a ceiling of €1 million, which will 
be offset by negative tax bases within a period of fi ve years. For all corporations, a capitalisation 
reserve is set up consisting of a 10% reduction in the tax base further to the assignment of profi t 
to own funds, which seeks to promote the earmarking of profi t to increasing companies’ own 
funds. In any event, the ceiling on the deductibility of fi nancial expenses is maintained. 
6.2 Other taxes on capital 
Of note regarding other taxes on capital are those arising from the income of the self-
employed and the returns on the saving and capital gains of households, which are taxed under 
personal income tax.27 The revenue obtained from these income sources in the EU27 amounted 
in 2012 to 1.4% of GDP in the case of the income of the self-employed and to 0.6% in the 
income from capital of households. Spain’s revenue-raising capacity in both sources of income 
is higher, at 1.7% of GDP and 0.8% of GDP, respectively. Finally, regarding the taxes on wealth, 
the resulting revenue accounted for around 2.8% of GDP in Spain in 2012 compared with 1.9% 
on average in the EU27. A more detailed analysis is conducted below on taxes on property in 
Spain and the related comparison with the EU. 
26  Nonetheless, forgone revenue is greater when an analysis is made of the difference between reported corporate 
earnings and earnings subject to tax resulting from applying tax adjustments, positive and negative alike, to book 
profi t. According to AEAT (2013), the adjustments entail a 20% reduction in the tax base amount (€27 billion), whose 
estimated impact on revenue is around €5 billion (25% of expected revenue).
27  In the EU, most of this income is subject to the progressive tax brackets under the personal income tax schedule, 
though in a good number of EU countries the returns on capital are taxed at a single rate lower than the average 
personal income tax rate, or with a schedule evidencing less progressivity owing both to its lower rates and to the 
greater width of the base subject to taxation.
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7 Taxes on property
A portion of the taxes on capital may be grouped together under a heading known as 
taxes on property, which includes taxes levied on both ownership of assets and the transfer 
thereof between economic agents. 
The relative weight of taxes on property on average for the EU27 accounted for 1.4% 
of GDP in 2012, having moved on a stable trend over the past decade (see Chart 29). Spain 
stands out for the greater relative weight of these taxes and for their strong increase over the past 
upturn, when they climbed from 1.5% in 1995 to 3.3% in 2006. Much of this increase was due 
to the rise in real estate and fi nancial transfers associated with the real estate boom, meaning 
that the economic crisis, which signifi cantly reduced the volume of transactions and asset values, 
prompted a substantial decline in the revenue raised from this type of tax to 2.2% of GDP in 2012. 
Despite this notable fall-off, the contribution of these taxes to Spain’s revenue-raising 
capacity is above the EU27 average and is similar to its weighted average (2.3% of GDP in 2012). 
The heterogeneity across European countries is, in any event, signifi cant; while in the United 
Kingdom the weight of these types of taxes rises to 4% of GDP, and exceeds 3% in France and 
Belgium, in Estonia, Croatia and the Czech Republic it is below or equal to 0.5% of GDP. 
As regards their composition, most (60%) of the attendant revenue in the EU27 is 
attributable to the so-called recurrent tax on real estate property, averaging 0.8% of GDP in 
2012, which is held stable in the past decade. However, these types of taxes are particularly 
relevant in Denmark and France, where the take exceeds 2 pp of GDP, and especially in the 
United Kingdom, where it accounts for 3.4% of GDP. Spain, with a weight in terms of GDP 
averaging 0.8% in the EU27 since 1995, has seen notable increases since 2010 that have placed 
its contribution at 1.2% of GDP in 2012. These rises in taxes on real estate property have partly 
corrected the bias existing in Spain towards the taxation of asset transactions, at the expense 
of recurrent taxes on property, which came to account for 80% of this type of taxation in 2006 
(compared with 50% in 2012). In any event, the weight of transactions taxes relative to total tax 
revenue on property remains more than 10 pp higher in Spain than the European average. 
The remaining taxes on property (other than recurrent taxation on real estate property 
and which includes the tax on transactions) account for a lesser weight in the EU27, averaging 
0.5% of GDP in 2012. Spain is characterised by its systematically higher tax-raising capacity 
in these taxes, which rose from 1.5% of GDP in 2000 to 2.6% in 2006 as a result of the sharp 
economic growth over that period. The collapse in real estate transfers in the latter phase of the 
recessionary cycle placed the weight of these taxes at 1% of GDP in 2012. 
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8 Conclusions
This paper compares the structure and revenue-raising capacity of the Spanish tax 
system with those observed in the European Union. The following conclusions may be drawn 
from the analysis. 
Spain is notable for its relatively low weight of tax revenue as a proportion of GDP 
compared with the EU average. This lower tax-take is essentially due to indirect taxation. Indeed, 
it evidences the lowest weight in terms of taxes on consumption of all the EU27 countries 
and its implied rates are signifi cantly lower. This is the outcome above all of lower VAT takings 
due partly to the fact that the standard rate, despite standing at the EU27 average, affects a 
lower percentage of consumer spending that is the case in most of the Member States. Excise 
duty revenues are also lower, particularly in the case of hydrocarbons, transport and alcohol, 
on which goods the implied rates are relatively low. Furthermore, less revenue is derived from 
environmental taxes.
As to labour taxation, revenue as a percentage of GDP in Spain is similar to that of the 
EU27 average (though lower than the weighted average of the EU27), while the weight of social 
security contributions is greater, in particular those levied on fi rms. The average tax wedge, 
measured as the ratio of the sum of personal income tax derived from taxes on labour and social 
security contributions, on one hand, to the average gross wages of full-time employees in the 
private sector, on the other, is above the OECD average in Spain for all income brackets and 
types of individuals by household position. 
The weight in GDP of revenue arising from taxes on capital is higher than the EU27 
average, owing to higher taxes on wealth, while the taxes on corporate income and on capital 
are similar. Generally, the implied rates on capital are slightly higher than those of Spain’s 
Community counterparts. In the specifi c case of corporate income tax, the effective theoretical 
rates (average and marginal) are also higher. Further, revenue arising from taxes on property is 
higher, in particular that derived from asset transactions. 
As regards the distribution of tax competencies among the different tiers of government, 
Spain is among Europe’s most decentralised countries, given that more than 40% of taxes are 
assigned to or received by regional and local government. 
In the cases of taxes on labour and on capital, it should nevertheless be borne in 
mind that the proposed tax reform submitted by the government to Parliament last August will 
alter some of the results of the comparison mentioned above once it comes into force as from 
2015. The reason is that this reform focuses essentially on personal income tax and corporate 
income tax. Specifi cally, under personal income tax, consideration is given to a reduction in the 
number of brackets (including the attendant minimum and maximum rates), and increases in 
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the personal and household minimum, which will involve a reduction in average rates. In the 
case of corporate income tax, a reduction in the tax rate for large corporations from 30% to 
25% in 2016, which will likewise be applicable to SMEs, is proposed alongside various changes 
to the tax base and to allowances. However, no far-reaching amendments are proposed in 
respect of indirect taxation or social security contributions.28 Overall, the reform would have 
an ex post revenue-raising cost, according to estimates by the Ministry of Finance and Public 
Administration, of €7.6 billion in the 2017 horizon.
Finally, some of the limitations of the analysis in this paper should be highlighted. They 
arise, above all, from the fact that the comparison of the Spanish tax system with those of the 
other EU countries is made drawing on the ratios of tax revenue to GDP and on the calculation 
of effective average rates. These metrics are habitually used to measure tax pressure. However, 
they pose certain methodological problems that affect both their level and how they change over 
time, and which hamper cross-country comparison. In particular, these measures do not take 
into account aspects such as the means of funding specifi c public policies via public spending 
or via tax expenditure, the subjection or not of welfare benefi ts to taxation, the effects of the 
business cycle and/or the existence of a black economy or of tax evasion. All these factors 
mean the conclusions that may be drawn from the changes in these ratios should be viewed 
with caution. 
28  However, in the case of social security contributions, various rebates for new hires have been approved in recent years. 
These include most notably, owing to their wide reach and amount, that included in Royal Decree-Law 3/2014 of 28 
February 2014, approving a reduction in the social security contribution for common contingencies payable by fi rms 
of up to €100 per worker per month over two years (fl at rate, irrespective of the contribution base) for all permanent 
employee hires entailing job creation in the fi rm made before 31 December 2014.
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Box 1. Tax revenue in Spain during the economic crisis 
The economic crisis has had a most signifi cant adverse impact on public revenue 
(see Table 2). Specifi cally, public revenue raised stood in 2013 at €386,250 million (37.8% of 
GDP), down €46,851 million (3.4 pp of GDP) on 2007, a decline of 11%. Moreover, it should be 
borne in mind that during this period tax measures were adopted that gave rise to an estimated 
increase in revenue of around 2.7 pp of GDP. If the impact of these increases in revenue in 2013 
is eliminated, the decline in tax revenue over the 2007-2013 period would be 17%, equivalent 
to 6 pp of GDP. 
Stripping out the effect of the tax measures during the period, two taxes have performed 
particularly negatively during the crisis. Specifi cally, corporate income tax and VAT revenue, net 
of the impact of the measures approved, declined by 2.5 pp and 1.7 pp of GDP, respectively. 
In the case of VAT, however, the various tax rises approved impacted revenue by around 1.8 pp 
of GDP, meaning that actual VAT takings would have increased by 0.1% of GDP in the period, 
despite the notable decline in VAT bases. 
The economic crisis also had a signifi cant impact on transfer and stamp tax revenue, 
takings for which declined by 1.1 pp of GDP, and on taxes on consumption, which fell by 0.7% 
of GDP. In this latter case, however, the measures approved managed to curb its reduction to 
0.1% of GDP. Finally, the reductions in revenue in respect of personal income tax and of social 
security contributions were, on the contrary, lower. 
Accordingly, the reduction in tax revenue can be seen to be concentrated in those taxes 
that depend on developments in corporate profi ts (corporate income tax), consumption (excise 
duties and VAT) and the housing market (VAT and transfer and stamp tax). All these moved on a 
particularly negative trend during the economic crisis, and nominal GDP does not approximate 
well to their tax base. 
Overall, there was a collapse in tax revenue during the economic crisis associated with 
the disappearance of the extraordinary revenue built up in the previous upturn and related in 
particular to the real estate boom, and the strong decline in business profi ts and in domestic 
demand.29 This analysis should be borne in mind in light of the projected future course of tax 
revenue in Spain. Specifi cally, although revenue may be expected to improve in step with the 
recovery in the business cycle, any pick-up in the extraordinary revenue linked to the pre-crisis 
boom should be ruled out. 
29  For a detailed analysis of revenue in the period prior to the economic crisis and its attendant transitory component, see 
“La recaudación impositiva en el último decenio” by A.L. Gómez, P. Hernández de Cos and F. Martí (Banco de España, 
Boletín Económico, April 2005) and “Una aproximación al componente transitorio del saldo público en España”, by F. 
de Castro, A. Estrada, P. Hernández de Cos and F. Martí (Banco de España, Boletín Económico, June 2008).
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SOURCES: Eurostat (2014) and OECD (2013). 
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TAX REVENUE AS A % OF GDP IN 2012: BREAKDOWN BY EU AND OECD COUNTRY  CHART 2 
SOURCES: Eurostat (2014) and OECD (2013).
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SOURCES: OECD (2013) and IGAE. 
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SOURCE: Taxing Wages Database (2013).
a The average tax wedge on labour income for each type of individual is the ratio between personal income tax on employment income and social contributions, 
on the one hand, and the average full-time gross wage in the private sector on the other. 
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EUR millions
VAT-related tax beneðts 33,256.64
   Exemptions 13,642.88
   Super-reduced rate (4 %) 5,551.88
   Reduced rate (10 %) 14,061.88
Excise duty-related tax benejts 1,966.67
    a. Duty on hydrocarbons 1,895.45
        Exemptions 757.74
        Reduced rates 906.76
        Refunds 230.95
     b. Duty on alcohol and derivative beverages 72.40
         Exemptions 61.14
         Reduced rates 11.26
Personal income tax-related tax beneðts 31,027.30
    Tax reductions 21,256.00
        Of which: salary income 13,864.92
        Of which: combined taxes 3,609.44
        Of which: pension plan contributions 2,173.84
    Tax credits 7,058.98
        Of which: purchase of principal residence 3,570.86
    Exemptions 2,441.92
Corporation tax-related tax beneðts 3,309.95
    Tax deductions 251.74
    Reduced rates 1,251.57
        Of which: 25% rate applicable to SMEs 495.53
        Of which: reduced SME job-creation rate 365.76
    Rebates 188.23
    Tax credits 1,618.41
        Of which: R+D activities 243.27
        Of which: SMEs’ reinvestment of earnings 547.00
TAX BENEFITS IN 2014 TABLE 1 
 









































(4) = (3) – (1)
2013-2007
 (5) = (3)/(1)
2007          
(6)
2013          
(7)
2013-2007











(11) = ((3) – (9))/(1)
Taxes on production
and imports 122,005 92,355 112,914 -9,091 -7.5 11.6 11.0 -0.5 2.7 -3.2 -29.9
   VAT (excl. EU) 61,261 41,878 60,593 -668 -1.1 5.8 5.9 0.1 1.8 -1.7 -31.6
   Transfer/Stamp tax 17,399 8,483 5,688 -11,711 -67.3 1.7 0.6 -1.1 0.0 -1.1 -68.4
   Taxes on consumption 25,328 23,447 23,240 -2,088 -8.2 2.4 2.3 -0.1 0.6 -0.7 -30.5
   Property tax 7,267 8,853 11,368 4,101 56.4 0.7 1.1 0.4 0.1 0.3 43.8
   Other indirect taxes 10,750 9,694 12,025 1,275 11.9 1.0 1.2 0.2 0.2 0.0 -5.9
Current taxes on income and wealth 136,921 100,839 105,107 -31,814 -23.2 13.0 10.3 -2.7 -0.1 -2.6 -22.5
    Personal income tax 79,731 71,480 78,039 -1,692 -2.1 7.6 7.6 0.1 0.3 -0.3 -6.2
    Corporate income tax 50,179 24,198 21,312 -28,867 -57.5 4.8 2.1 -2.7 -0.2 -2.5 -53.6
    Other direct taxes 7,011 5,161 5,757 -1,255 -17.9 0.7 0.6 -0.1 -0.2 0.1 14.9
Taxes on capital 5,352 4,318 5,036 -316 -5.9 0.5 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 -5.9
Social security contributions 136,752 140,144 130,438 -6,314 -4.6 13.0 12.8 -0.2 0.1 -0.3 -5.3
Adjustment for uncertain revenue -4,837 -9,351 -6,661 -1,824 37.7 -0.5 -0.7 -0.2
Other revenue 36,908 38,948 39,416 2,508 6.8 3.5 3.9 0.3 0.0 0.3 6.8
Total resources 433,101 367,253 386,250 -46,851 -10.8 41.1 37.8 -3.4 2.7 -6.0 -17.1
EUR millions As a % of GDP As a % of GDP
TAX REVENUE IN SPAIN DURING THE 2007-2013 CRISIS TABLE 2  
 
SOURCES: INE and IGAE. 
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